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Abstract. To examine the integrity and authenticity of an IP address efficiently and economically, 
this paper proposes a new non-Merkle-Damgård structural (non-MDS) hash function called JUNA 
that is based on a multivariate permutation problem and an anomalous subset product problem to 
which no subexponential time solutions are found so far. JUNA includes an initialization algorithm 
and a compression algorithm, and converts a short message of n bits which is regarded as only one 
block into a digest of m bits, where 80    m    232 and 80   m    n    4096. The analysis and 
proof show that the new hash is one-way, weakly collision-free, and strongly collision-free, and its 
security against existent attacks such as birthday attack and meet-in-the- middle attack is to O(2m). 
Moreover, a detailed proof that the new hash function is resistant to the birthday attack is given. 
Compared with the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash based on a discrete logarithm problem, the new 
hash is lightweight, and thus it opens a door to convenience for utilization of lightweight digital 
signing schemes. 
Keywords: Hash function; Compression algorithm; Non-iterative structure; Provable security; 
Birthday attack; Meet-in-the- middle attack 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, the ECC-160 digital signing scheme, an analogue of the ElGamal digital signing 
scheme based on a discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in an elliptic curve group over a finite field, and 
some lightweight digital signing schemes have been utilized for RF (Radio Frequency) identity tags or 
non-RF identity tags. A RF identity tag contains an IC chip which is used to store signatures and other 
data, while a non-RF identity tag contains no IC chip because a signature by a lightweight or 
ultra-lightweight signing scheme may be converted into a short visual string less than 22 characters, 
and printed directly on a papery tag or label. In the near future, such non-RF tags will be applied to the 
identification, authentication, or anti-forgery of financial notes, bills, certificates, diplomas, and 
commodities, particularly including foods and drugs. 
Additionally, message digests outputted by a hash function may be utilized to examine the integrity 
and authenticity of IP addresses in a transmitted data packet so as to prevent the source address and 
destination address from being tampered or forged. 
It is well understood that we first need to extract the digest of a message by employing a hash 
function before signing the message [1][2][3]. Traditionally, a hash function consists of a compression 
function and the Merkle-Damgård iterative structure [4][5]. Let ĥ be a hash function, and usually, it has 
the four properties as follows: 
 given a message , it is very easy to calculate the message digest ḏ = ĥ (), where ḏ is also called 
a hash output, namely ĥ is computable; 
 given a digest ḏ, it is very hard to calculate the message  according to ḏ = ĥ (), namely ĥ is 
one-way; 
 given any arbitrary message , it is computationally infeasible to find another message ′ such 
that ĥ() = ĥ(′), namely ĥ is weakly collision-free; 
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 it is computationally infeasible to find two arbitrary messages   ′ such that ĥ() = ĥ(′), 
namely ĥ is strongly collision-free. 
The word “infeasible” means that some problem cannot be solved at least in polynomial time or in 
tolerable subexponential time. 
At present, SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-384 announced by NIST are among the hash functions that 
are believed to be secure though they each cannot resist birthday attack, which means that the security 
of each of them is nearly the O(2 m / 2) magnitude, where m is the bit-length of a message digest namely 
a hash output. It is well known that the output bit-lengths of these three functions are 160, 256, and 384 
respectively. 
When any of the three is practically paired with a lightweight signing scheme of which the modulus 
length is between 80 and 160 bits, its output must be adjusted to the range of the modulus length of the 
singing scheme with its security unchanged or corresponding to the signing scheme. 
The modulus length of the optimized REESSE1+ signing scheme based on a transcendental 
logarithm problem and a polynomial root finding problem is 80 [6], and its security is the 280 
magnitude at present. When SHA-1 is paired with this signing scheme, the output of SHA-1 must be 
adjusted to 80 bits with its security unchanged. Again when SHA-256 is paired with ECC-160, the 
output of SHA-256 must be adjusted to 160 bits with its security being at least the 280 magnitude. 
Therefore, it is a problem in practice how to adjust a message digest from a classical hash function 
to the range of the modulus bit-length of a host signing scheme and to keep the security of the message 
digest being unchanged or corresponding to the host signing scheme. 
In this paper, the authors devise a new non-Merkle-Damgård structural (non-MDS) hash function 
called JUNA which is based on a multivariate permutation problem (MPP) and an anomalous subset 
product problem (ASPP) [6][7], and includes two algorithms: an initialization algorithm and a 
compression algorithm, converts a short message or a message digest of n bits into an output string of 
m bits, where 80  m  232 and 80  m  n  4096, and moreover ensures that the security of the output 
against existent collision attacks is to the O(2m) magnitude. 
The new hash is efficient and economical in the integrity examination, and has two dominant 
novelties: 
 devising the initialization algorithm based on a MPP which only has an exponential time solution 
currently, and makes the new hash function be able to resist birthday attack; 
 devising the compression algorithm based on an ASPP which also only has an exponential time 
solution currently, and makes the new hash function be able to resist other conventional attacks, 
especially meet-in-the-middle attack. 
The significance of the paper lies in the thing that a new non-iterative hash function with an m-bit 
output and the O(2m) magnitude security is first proposed by the authors while a classical iterative hash 
function with an m-bit output bears only the O(2m / 2) magnitude security. 
Throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified, an even number n  80 is the bit-length of a short 
message or the item-length of a sequence, the sign % denotes “modulo”,  does “M – 1” with M prime, 
lg x means a logarithm of x to the base 2, bi does NOT operation of a bit bi, Þ does the maximal prime 
allowed in a coprime sequence, |x| does the absolute value of a number x, x does the order of x % M, S 
 does the size of a set S, and gcd(x, y) represents the greatest common divisor of two integers x and y. 
Without ambiguity, “% M ” is usually omitted in expressions. 
2 Several Definitions 
2.1 A Coprime Sequence 
Definition 1: If A1, …, An are n pairwise distinct positive integers such that  Ai and Aj (i  j), either 
gcd(Ai, Aj) = 1 or gcd(Ai, Aj) = F  1 with (Ai / F) ł Ak and (Aj / F) ł Ak  k ( i, j)  [1, n], these ordered 
integers are called a coprime sequence, denoted by {A1, …, An}, and shortly {Ai}. 
Notice that the elements of a coprime sequence are not necessarily pairwise coprime, but a sequence 
of which all the elements are pairwise coprime is a coprime sequence. 
For example, {15, 29, 163, 31, 37, 509, 21, 1669}, {37, 23, 7, 1009, 3, 1999, 937, 17}, {3607, 61, 
59, 97, 1021, 211, 863, 2039}, and {10, 211, 127, 3, 14, 1021, 2017, 263} are four coprime sequences 
separately. 
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Property 1: Let {A1, …, An} be a coprime sequence. If randomly select k  [1, n] elements Ax1, , 
Axk from the sequence, then the mapping from a subset {Ax1, , Axk} to a subset product G =  k  i = 1Axi is 
one-to-one, namely the mapping from b1…bn to G =  n  i = 1Aibi is one-to-one, where b1…bn is a bit string.  
Refer to [6] for its proof. 
2.2 A Bit Shadow and a Bit Long-shadow 
Definition 2: Let b1…bn  0 be a bit string. Then ḅi with i  [1, n] is called a bit shadow if it comes 
from such a rule:  
 ḅi = 0 if bi = 0;  
 ḅi = 1 + the number of successive 0-bits before bi if bi = 1; or  
 ḅi = 1 + the number of successive 0-bits before bi + the number of successive 0-bits after the 
rightmost 1-bit if bi is the leftmost 1-bit. 
Notice that the third point of this definition is slightly different from that in [6]. 
For example, let b1…b8 = 01010100, then ḅ1…ḅ8 = 04020200. 
Fact 1: Let ḅ1…ḅn be the bit shadow string of b1…bn  0. Then there is  n i=1 ḅ i = n. 
Proof:  
According to Definition 2, every bit of b1…bn is considered into  k i=1 ḅxi, where ḅx1, …, ḅxk are 1-bit 
shadows in the string ḅ1…ḅn, and there is  k i=1 ḅxi = n. 
On the other hand, there is  nk j=1  ḅyj = 0, where ḅy1, …, ḅyn  k are 0-bit shadows. 
In total, there is  n i=1 ḅi = n.                                                          
Property 2: Let {A1, …, An} be a coprime sequence, and ḅ1…ḅn be the bit shadow string of b1…bn  
0. Then the mapping from b1…bn to G =  n i=1 Aiḅi is one-to-one. 
Proof:  
Step 1. Let b1…bn and b′1…b′n be two different nonzero bit strings, and ḅ1…ḅn and ḅ′1…ḅ′n be the 
two corresponding bit shadow strings. 
If ḅ1…ḅn = ḅ′1…ḅ′n, then by Definition 2, there is b1…bn = b′1…b′n. 
In addition, for any arbitrary bit shadow string ḅ1…ḅn, there always exists a preimage b1…bn. Thus, 
the mapping from b1…bn to ḅ1…ḅn is one-to-one. 
Step 2. Obviously the mapping from ḅ1…ḅn to  n i=1 Ai ḅi is surjective. 
Again presuppose that  n i=1 Ai ḅi =  n i=1 Ai ḅ′i for ḅ1…ḅn  ḅ′1…ḅ′n. 
Since {A1, …, An} is a coprime sequence, and Ai ḅi either equals 1 with ḅi = 0 or contains the same 
prime factors as those of Ai with ḅi  0, we can obtain ḅ1…ḅn = ḅ′1…ḅ′n from  n i=1 Ai ḅi =  n i=1 Ai ḅ′i, which 
is in direct contradiction to ḅ1…ḅn  ḅ′1…ḅ′n.  
Therefore, the mapping from ḅ1…ḅn to  n i=1 Ai ḅi is injective [8]. 
In summary, the mapping from ḅ1…ḅn to  n i=1 Ai ḅi is one-to-one, and further the mapping from 
b1…bn to  n i=1 Ai ḅi is also one-to-one.                                                     
Definition 3: Let ḅ1…ḅn be the bit shadow string of b1…bn  0. Then ƀi = ḅi 2 i with i  [1, n] is 
called a bit long-shadow, where  i = bi + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2) = 0 or 1. 
According to Definition 3, it is not difficult to understand that for every ƀi, there is 0  ƀi  n when 
b1…bn  0. 
For example, let b1…b8 = 01010100, then ƀ1…ƀ8 = 08020400. 
Fact 2: Let ƀ1 … ƀn be the bit long-shadow string of b1 … bn  0. Then there is n  n i=1 ƀi  2n. 
Proof:  
By Definition 3 and Fact 1, we have 
 n i=1 ƀ i =  n i=1 ḅi 2 i and  n i=1 ḅi = n. 
If every bi = 1, namely every  i = 1, then 
 n i=1 ƀ i =  n i=1 ḅi 2 i = 2 n i=1 ḅi = 2n. 
Again, by Definition 3, not all the bits of b1…bn are zero. 
If there exists only one nonzero bit in b1…bn ― bx = 1 with x  [1, n] for example, then  
 3
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1408.5999 < 
 n i=1 ƀ i =  n i=1 ḅi 2 i = ḅx 2x = ḅx = n, 
where  x = bx + (1) 2(x – 1) / n (n / 2) = 0 due to bx being the unique nonzero bit. 
Thus, it holds that n   n i=1 ƀ i  2n.                                                    
Property 3: Let ƀ1…ƀn be the bit long-shadow string of b1…bn  0. Then the mapping from b1…bn 
to ƀ1…ƀn is one-to-one. 
Proof:  
On one hand, assume that a bit string b1…bn  0 is known. 
It is understood from Definition 3 that ƀi = ḅi 2 i for each i. 
Because when b1…bn is known, ḅ1…ḅn and  1…n can be respectively determined, ƀ 1…ƀ n can also 
be determined uniquely. 
On the other hand, assume that a bit long-shadow string ƀ 1…ƀ n is known. 
According to ƀi = ḅi 2i and ƀi = 0 with ḅi = 0, where i = bi + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2), we can determinate bi for i 
= 1, …, n as follows. 
 Case of ƀi = 0 
If ƀi = 0, then ḅi = 0, and set bi = 0. 
 Case of ƀi  0 
If ƀi  0, then ḅi  0, and set bi = 1. 
In this way, the value of every bi can be determined uniquely. 
In summary, the mapping from b1…bn to ƀ1…ƀn is one-to-one.                              
2.3 A Lever Function 
The devising of the initialization algorithm of the new hash function is based on the intractable 
problem Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i)) δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n which is first utilized for the REESSE1+ asymmetric 
cryptosystem, where the exponent ℓ(i) is called a lever function [6]. 
Definition 4: The secret parameter ℓ(i) in the transform of a non-iterative hash function is called a 
lever function, if it has the following features: 
 ℓ(.) is an injection from the domain {1, …, n} to the codomain   {5, …, } with  large; 
 the mapping between i and ℓ(i) is established randomly without an analytical expression; 
 an attacker has to be faced with all the permutations of elements in  when inferring a related 
private parameter from a public parameter or an initial value; 
 the owner of the private parameter only need to consider the polynomial arithmetic of elements in 
 when decrypting a ciphertext or seeking a collision. 
Feature  and  make it clear that if n is large enough, it is infeasible for the attacker to search all 
the permutations of elements in  exhaustively while the decryption or collision computation by the 
owner of the private parameter is feasible. Thus, the amount of calculation on ℓ(.) is large at “a public 
terminal”, and is small at “a private terminal”. 
Property 4 (Indeterminacy of ℓ(.)): Let δ = 1 and Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i))δ (% M) with ℓ(i)   = {5, …, n + 
4} and Ai   = {2, …, Þ | 863  Þ  1201} for i = 1, …, n. Then  W (W   )  (1, ), and  x, y, z 
(x  y  z)  [1, n], 
 when ℓ(x) + ℓ(y) = ℓ(z), there is ℓ(x) + W  + ℓ(y) + W   ℓ(z) + W  (% ); 
 when ℓ(x) + ℓ(y)  ℓ(z), there always exist 
Cx  A′x W′ ℓ′(x) (% M), Cy  A′y W′ ℓ′(y) (% M), and Cz  A′z W′ ℓ′(z) (% M) 
such that ℓ′(x) + ℓ′(y)  ℓ′(z) (% ) with the constraint A′z  Þ. 
Proof: 
 It is easy to understand that  
W ℓ(x )  W ℓ(x ) + W , W ℓ(y )  W ℓ(y ) + W , and 
W ℓ(z )  W ℓ(z ) + W  (% M). 
Due to W   , 2W   W , and ℓ(x) + ℓ(y) = ℓ(z), it follows that  
ℓ(x) + W  + ℓ(y) + W   ℓ(z) + W  (% ). 
However, it should be noted that when W  = , there is ℓ(x) + W  + ℓ(y) + W   ℓ(z) + W  (% ). 
 Let Ōd be an oracle on solving a discrete logarithm problem. 
Suppose that W ′  [1, ] is a generator of ( * M , ·). 
In light of group theories,  A′z  {2, …, Þ}, the congruence 
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Cz  A′z W ′ ℓ′ (z ) (% M) 
has a solution. Then, ℓ′(z) may be taken through Ōd. 
 ℓ′(x)  [1, ], and let  
ℓ′(y)  ℓ′(z) – ℓ′(x) (% ). 
Further, from the congruences Cx  A′x W ′ ℓ′ (x ) (% M) and Cy  A′y W ′ ℓ′ (y ) (% M), we can obtain many 
distinct pairs (A′x, A′y), where A′x, A′y  (1, M), and ℓ′(x) + ℓ′(y)  ℓ′(z) (% ). 
In this way, Property 4 is proven.                                                     
Notice that letting  = {5, …, n + 4}, namely every ℓ(i)  5 makes seeking W from W ℓ(i)  Ai–1 Ci (% 
M) face an unsolvable Galois group when the value of Ai  Þ is guessed [9], and moreover Property 4 
still holds when  is any subset containing n elements from {1, …, }. 
Property 4 manifests that will continued fraction attack on Ci  Ai W ℓ(i) (% M) by Theorem 12.19 in 
Section 12.3 of [10] be utterly ineffectual only if elements in  are fitly selected [11]. 
3 Design of the New Non-iterative Hash Function 
The Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash function, a non-iterative one, is appreciable. It is based on a 
discrete logarithm problem, and proved to be strongly collision-free [12]. 
The new non-iterative hash function is composed of two algorithms which contain two main 
parameters m and n, where m denotes the bit-length of a modulus utilized in the new hash, n denotes 
the bit-length of a short message or a message digest from a classical hash function, and there are 80  
m  232 with 80  m  n  4096. 
Additionally,  and   are two integral sets. Their lengths are selected as 210    232 and n    = 
ñ  232, and moreover make 2n5 5  2m (see Section 4.1.1). Notice that 210    232 means 10  
lgÞ  32. 
For example, as m = 80  n, there should be  = 210 and   = n; as m = 96  n, should  = 212 and 
  = n; as m = 112  n, should  = 214 and   = n; as m = 128  n, should  = 216 and   = 212; as m 
= 232  n, should  = 232 and   = 232. 
3.1 Initialization Algorithm 
This algorithm is employed by an authoritative third party or the owner of a key pair, and only needs 
to be executed one time. 
INPUT: the bit-length m of a modulus with 80  m  232; 
the item-length n of a sequence with 80  m  n  4096; 
the maximal prime Þ with 10  lgÞ  32; 
the size ñ of the set   with 2ñn5Þ 5  2m and n  ñ  232. 
S1: Produce   {2, 3, …, Þ}; 
produce a random coprime sequence {A1, , An | Ai  }. 
S2: Find a prime M with lg M = m such that  / 2 is a prime, 
or the least prime factor of  / 2 > 4n(2ñ + 3). 
S3: Pick W  (1,  ) making W   2m – lgÞ;  
pick δ  (1,  ) making gcd(δ,  ) = 1. 
S4: Randomly yield    {+/5, +/7, …, +/(2ñ + 3)}; 
randomly select pairwise distinct ℓ(i)    for i = 1, , n. 
S5: Compute Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i))δ % M for i = 1, , n. 
OUTPUT: an initial value ({Ci}, M) which is public to the people. 
A private parameter ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ) may be discarded, but must not be divulged. 
At S3, to seek W, let W  g / F (% M), where g is a generator of ( *  M , ·) obtained through Algorithm 
4.80 in Section 4.6 of [1], and F < 2lg Þ is a factor of . 
At S4,  = {+/5, +/7, …, +/(2ñ + 3)} indicates that  is one of 2ñ potential sets, indeterminate, 
and unknown to the public, where “+/” means the selection of the “+” or “” sign. Notice that in the 
arithmetic modulo , x represents  – x. 
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Definition 5: Given ({Ci}, M), seeking the original ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ) from Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i))δ (% M) 
with Ai  {2, 3, …, Þ | 10  lgÞ  32} and ℓ(i)  {+/5, +/7, …, +/(2ñ + 3) | n  ñ  232} for i = 
1, …, n is referred to as a multivariate permutation problem, shortly MPP [6]. 
Property 5: The MPP Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i))δ (% M) with Ai  {2, 3, …, Þ | 10  lgÞ  32} and ℓ(i)  
{+/5, +/7, …, +/(2ñ + 3) | n  ñ  232} for i = 1, …, n is computationally at least equivalent to the 
discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the same prime field. 
3.2 Compression Algorithm 
This algorithm is employed by one who wants to obtain a short message digest. 
INPUT: an initial value ({C1, , Cn}, M), where lg M = m with 80  m  n  4096; 
A short message (or a digest from a classical hash function) b1…bn  0. 
S1: Set k  0, i  1. 
S2: If bi = 0 then  
S2.1: let k  k + 1, ḅi  0 
else 
S2.2: if i = k + 1 then let   i; 
S2.3: let ḅi  k + 1, k  0. 
S3: Let i  i + 1;  
if i  n then go to S2. 
S4: Compute ḅ  ḅ + k. 
S5: Compute ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi % M,  
where ƀi = ḅi 2i with  i = bi + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2). 
OUTPUT: a digest ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) of which the bit-length is m. 
It is easily known from Definition 3 that the max of {ƀ1, …, ƀn} is less than or equal to n when 
b1…bn  0. 
Definition 6: Given (ḏ, M), seeking the original ƀ1…ƀn from ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M), where ƀi = ḅi 2i 
with  i = bi + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2) and ḅi being a bit shadow is referred to as an anomalous subset product 
problem, shortly ASPP [6]. 
Property 6: The ASPP ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M), where ƀi = ḅi 2i with  i = bi + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2) and ḅi being a 
bit shadow is computationally at least equivalent to the DLP in the same prime field. 
3.3 Proofs of Property 5 and 6 
Definition 7: Let A and B be two computational problems. A is said to reduce to B in polynomial 
time, written as A  P T  B, if there is an algorithm for solving  which calls, as a subroutine, a 
hypothetical algorithm for solving B, and runs in polynomial time, excluding the time of the algorithm 
for solving B [1][13]. 
The hypothetical algorithm for solving B is called an oracle. It is easy to understand that no matter 
what the time complexity of the oracle is, it does not influence the result of the comparison. 
A  P T  B means that the difficulty of A is not greater than that of B, namely the time complexity of the 
fastest algorithm for solving A is not greater than that of the fastest algorithm for solving B when all 
polynomial times are treated as the identical magnitude. Concretely speaking, if A cannot be solved in 
polynomial or subexponential time, correspondingly B cannot also be solved in polynomial or 
subexponential time; and if B can be solved in polynomial or subexponential time, correspondingly A 
can also be solved in polynomial or subexponential time. 
Definition 8: Let A and B be two computational problems. If A  P T  B and B  P T  A, then A and B are 
said to be computationally equivalent, written as A = P T  B [1][13]. 
A = P T  B means that either if A is a intractability with a certain complexity on a condition that its 
dominant variable approaches a large number, B is also a intractability with the same complexity on the 
identical condition; or both A and B can be solved in linear or polynomial time. 
Obviously, Definition 7 and 8 gives a partial order relation among the complexities or difficulties of 
computational problems [14], and suggest a reductive proof method called polynomial time Turing 
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reduction (PTR) [13]. 
In addition, for convenience sake, let Ĥ(y = f(x)) represent the complexity or difficulty of the 
problem of solving y = f(x) for x [15]. 
What follows is the proof of Property 5. 
Proof:  
Firstly, we systematically consider Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i))δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n. 
Assume that each gi  Ai W ℓ (i) (% M) with ℓ(i)  {+/5, +/7, …, +/(2ñ + 3) | n  ñ  232} is a 
constant. 
Let 
gi  g xi (% M), and zi  δ xi (% ), 
where g  * M be a generator. 
Then, there is 
Ci  gi δ  g δ xi (% M) for i = 1, …, n. 
Again let  
δ xi  zi (% ).  
Further 
Ci  g zi (% M) for i = 1, …, n. 
The above expression corresponds to the fact that in the ElGamal cryptosystem where many users 
share the modulus and a key generator, User 1 acquires a private key z1 and a public key C1, …, and 
User n acquires a private key zn and a public key Cn. It is well known that in this case, the attack of an 
adversary is still faced with the DLP, namely seeking zi from the simultaneous equation Ci  g zi (% M) 
for i = 1, …, n is computationally equivalent to the DLP [1]. 
Thus, when every gi is weakened to a constant, seeking δ from Ci  gi δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n is 
computationally equivalent to the DLP, which indicates that when every gi is not a constant, seeking gi 
and δ from Ci  giδ (% M) for i = 1, …, n is computationally at least equivalent to the DLP. 
Secondly, singly consider a certain Ci, where the subscript i is designated. 
Assume that Ōm(Ci, M, Ṟ) is an oracle on solving Ci  gi δ (% M) for gi and δ, where i is in {1, …, n}, 
and Ṟ is a constraint on gi such that the original gi and δ can be found. 
Let y  g x (% M) be of the DLP. Then, by calling Ōm(y, M, g), x can be obtained. 
According to Definition 7, there is 
Ĥ(y  g x (% M))  P T  Ĥ(Ci  gi δ (% M)), 
which indicates that when only a certain gi is known, seeking gi and δ from Ci  gi δ (% M) is 
computationally at least equivalent to the DLP. 
Integrally, we say that seeking the original {Ai}, {ℓ(i)}, W, and δ from the public key Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i))δ 
(% M) for i = 1, …, n is computationally at least equivalent to the DLP in the same prime field.      
What follows is the proof of Property 6. 
Proof: 
Assume that Ōa(ḏ, C1, , Cn, M) is an oracle on solving ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) for ƀ1…ƀn, where ƀ1…ƀn 
is the bit long-shadow string of b1bn. 
Particularly, when C1 =  = Cn = C, define  
ḏ   n i=1 C (n + 1)n  i ƀi   n i=1 (C (n + 1)n  i)ƀi (% M) 
with 0  ƀi  n, and define the corresponding oracle as Ōa(ḏ, C (n + 1)n  1, , C (n + 1)0, M). 
Let Ḡ1   n i=1 Cibi (% M) be of the subset product problem (SPP) [6][7][16]. 
Since there is 0  bi  ƀi, and the mapping from ƀ1…ƀn to b1bn is one-to-one, by calling Ōa(Ḡ1, C1, 
, Cn, M), we can find b1bn. 
By Definition 7, there is  
Ĥ(Ḡ1   n i=1 Cibi (% M))  P T  Ĥ(ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M)). 
By Property 5 in [6], there is 
Ĥ(y  g x (% M))  P T  Ĥ(Ḡ1   n i=1 Cibi (% M)). 
Further, by transitivity, there is  
Ĥ(y  g x (% M))  P T  Ĥ(ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M)). 
Therefore, solving ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) for ƀ1…ƀn is at least equivalent to the DLP in the same prime 
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field in computational complexity.                                                      
4 Security Analysis of the New Hash Function 
It is should be noted that lg M = m, but not n, is the security dominant parameter of the new 
non-iterative hash function. 
4.1 Security of the Initialization Algorithm 
Clearly, the security of the initialization algorithm depends on the security of the MPP Ci  (Ai W ℓ(i))δ 
(% M) with Ai   = {2, 3, …, Þ | 10  lgÞ  32} and ℓ(i)    = {+/5, +/7, …, +/(2ñ + 3) | n  ñ 
 232} for i = 1, …, n. 
In [6], we analyze the security of the MPP Ci  (Ai Wℓ(i))δ (% M) with Ai  {2, 3, …, Þ | 863  Þ  
1201} and ℓ(i)  {5, 7, …, (2n + 3)} for i = 1, …, n from the three aspects, discover no subexponential 
time solution to it, and contrarily, find some evidence which inclines people to believe that the MPP is 
computationally harder than the DLP. 
Considering that the set   is different from the old in [6], and the range of Þ is larger than the old in 
[6], we will analyze the security of the MPP with the different restrictions additionally. 
4.1.1   Ineffectualness of Presupposing ℓ(x1) + ℓ(x2) = ℓ(y1) + ℓ(y2) 
Because of   = {+/5, +/7, …, +/(2ñ + 3)}, when the absolute values |ℓ(x1)|, |ℓ(x2)|, |ℓ(y1)|, |ℓ(y2)| 
are determined, the value ℓ(x1) + ℓ(x2)  (ℓ(y1) + ℓ(y2)) has 24 = 16 possible cases, which enhances the 
indeterminacy of the lever function, and increases the complexity of an attack task for cracking the 
MPP to some extent. 
Adversaries may try to eliminate W through judging ℓ(x1) + ℓ(x2) = ℓ(y1) + ℓ(y2). 
 x1, x2, y1, y2  [1, n], presuppose that ℓ(x1) + ℓ(x2) = ℓ(y1) + ℓ(y2) holds. 
Let  
Gz  Cx1Cx2(Cy1Cy2)–1 (% M), namely 
Gz  (Ax1Ax2(Ay1Ay2)–1)δ (% M). 
If the adversaries divine the values of Ax1, Ax2, Ay1, Ay2, and compute u, vx1, vx2, vy1, vy2 in at least 
LM [1 /3, 1.923] time such that 
Gz  gu, Ax1  gvx1, Ax2  gvx2, Ay1  gvy1, Ay2  gvy2 (% M), 
where g is a generator of ( * M , ·), then  
u  (vx1 + vx2 – vy1 – vy2)δ (%  ). 
If gcd(vx1 + vx2 – vy1 – vy2,  ) | u, the congruence in δ has solutions. Because each of Ax1, Ax2, Ay1, Ay2 
may traverse the interval , and the subscripts x1, x2, y1, y2 are unfixed, the number of potential values 
of δ is about n4 4. Notice that the number of non-repeated values of δ will be less than 2m. 
In succession, we need to seek W.  
Now, the most effectual approach to seeking W is that for every i, the adversaries fix a value of δ, 
divine Ai and ℓ(i), and find the set i according to Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i))δ (% M), where i is the set of possible 
values of W meeting Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i))δ (% M) for i = 1, …, n. If there exist W1  1, …, Wn  n which are 
pairwise equal, the divination of δ, {Ai}, and {ℓ(i)} is thought right; else fix another value of δ, repeat 
the above process. 
Notice that due to  / 2 = a prime or the least prime factor of  / 2 > 4n(2ñ + 3), W ℓ (i)  Ciδ1Ai1 (% 
M) can be solved in polynomial time, and besides letting W = g  % M is unnecessary. 
It is not difficulty to understand that the size of every i is about (2 ). 
In summary, the time complexity of the above attack task is 
Ŧ = (n + )LM [1 / 3, 1.923] + (n44) + (n44)(2 )n  
        2n5 5. 
Concretely speaking, 
For m = n = 80 with  = 210 &   = 80, Ŧ > 2(26.3)5(26.3)(210)5 = 288 > 2m. 
For m = n = 96 with  = 212 &   = 96, Ŧ > 2(26.5)5(26.5)(212)5 = 2100 > 2m. 
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For m = n = 112 with  = 214 &   = 112, Ŧ > 2(26.8)5(26.8)(214)5 = 2112 = 2m. 
For m = n = 128 with  = 216 &   = 212, Ŧ > 2(27)5(212)(216)5 = 2128 = 2m. 
For m = n = 232 with  = 232 &   = 232, Ŧ > 2(27.8)5(232)(232)5 = 2232 = 2m. 
Thus, the time complexity of the attack by presupposing ℓ(x1) + ℓ(x2) = ℓ(y1) + ℓ(y2) is not less than 
O(2m) when  and   are chosen suitably. 
4.1.2   Ineffectualness of Guessing W 
Owing to 80  lgM  232,  can be factorized in tolerable subexponential time, and further a 
value of W can be guessed. 
Adversaries may try to eliminate W through W W   1 (% M). 
Raising either side of every equation Ci  (Ai W ℓ (i))δ (% M) to the W-th power yields 
Ci W   (Ai)δ W  % M. 
Suppose that the value of every Ai   = {2, 3, …, Þ | 10  lgÞ  32} is guessed, or the possible 
values of every Ai are traversed. 
Let Ci  gu i (% M), and Ai  gvi (% M), where g is a generator of ( * M , ·). Then 
ui W   vi W  δ (% ) (i = 1, …, n). 
Notice that ui  vi δ (%  ), and {v1, …, vn} is not a super increasing sequence. 
The above congruence is seemingly the MH transform [17]. Actually, {v1 W, …, vn W} is not a 
super increasing sequence, and moreover there is not necessarily lg (ui W) = lg . 
Because vi W   [1,  ] is stochastic, the inverse δ–1 %  not need be close to the minimum 
 / (ui W ), 2 / (ui W ), …, or (ui W  – 1) / (ui W ). 
Namely δ–1 may lie at any integral position of the interval  
[k / (ui W ), (k + 1) / (ui W )], 
where k = 0, 1, …, ui W  – 1, which illustrates that the accumulation points of minima do not exist. 
Further observing, in this case, when i traverses the interval [2, n], the number of intersections of the 
intervals containing δ–1 is likely the max of {u1 W , …, un W } which is promisingly close to . 
Therefore, the Shamir attack by the accumulation point of minima is fully ineffectual [18]. 
Even if find out δ –1 through the Shamir attack method, because each of { v1, …, vn} has W  
solutions, the number of potential sequences {gv1, …, gvn} is up to W  n.  
Due to needing to verify whether {gv1, …, gvn} is a coprime sequence for each different sequence 
{v1, …, vn}, the number of possible coprime sequences is in proportion to W  n. Hence, the initial 
{A1, …, An} cannot be determined in subexponential time. Further, the value of W cannot be computed, 
and the values of W  and δ–1 cannot be verified, which indicates that the MPP can also be resistant to 
the Shamir attack by the accumulation point of minima. 
Additionally, the adversaries may divine the value of Ai in about O() time with i  [1, n], and 
compute δ by vi W   ui W δ (%  ). However, because of W  | , the equation will have W  
solutions. Therefore, the time complexity of finding the original δ is at least 
Ŧ = (n + )LM [1 / 3, 1.923] + W  
        (n + )LM [1 / 3, 1.923] + 2lgÞ2m – lgÞ 
        2 m. 
It is also not less than O(2m). 
4.2 Security of the Compression Algorithm 
The compression algorithm of which the input message is treated as only a block is the main body of 
the new non-iterative hash function, and thus, through it the four natural properties of the new hash 
function are embodied dominantly. 
Clearly, the security of the compression algorithm depends on the security of the ASPP ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi 
(% M), where ƀi = ḅi 2i with  i = bi + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2) and ḅi being a bit shadow. 
In [6], we analyze the security of the ASPP Ḡ   n i=1 Ci ḅi (% M) from the three aspects, discover no 
subexponential time solution to it, and contrarily, find some evidence which inclines people to believe 
that Ḡ   n i=1 Ci ḅi (% M) is computationally harder than the DLP. Due to ƀi = ḅi 2i  ḅi, the security 
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conclusion about Ḡ   n i=1 Ci ḅi (% M) is also suitable for ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) which is just another form 
of the ASPP. Hence ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) has no subexponential time solution at present. 
In what follows, we will analyze whether the compression formula ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) satisfies the 
four natural properties of a hash function, and especially resists the three classical attacks or not. 
In terms of Section 3.2, given the initial value ({Ci}, M) and a short message b1…bn, it is 
transparently easy to calculate the digest ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M). 
4.2.1   Compression Algorithm Is Computationally One-way 
Let C1  g u1 (% M), …, Cn  g un (% M), ḏ  g v (% M), where g is a generator of the group ( * M, ·), 
and easily found when lg M < 1024. 
Then, solving ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) for ƀ1…ƀn, namely b1…bn, is equivalent to solving 
ƀ1 u1 +  + ƀn un  v (%  ), 
which is called an anomalous subset sum problem, shortly ASSP [6], and computationally at least 
equivalent to a subset sum problem (SSP) due to ƀi = ḅi 2i  ḅi  bi  [0, 1]. 
The SSP has been proved to be NP-complete in its feasibility recognition form [19], and its 
computational version, especially the density-high or length-big one, is NP-hard [1][20]. Hence, 
solving ASSP is at least NP-hard. 
Moreover in the non-iterative hash function, there is n  m = lg M and n  ƀi  bi  [0, 1]. The 
knapsack density relevant to the ASSP ƀ1 u1 +  + ƀn un  v (%  ) roughly equals  
D =  n i=1 lg n / lg M  
       = n lg n / m  
       > lg n  
       > 1, 
which means that there exists many solutions to ƀ1 u1 +  + ƀn un  v (%  ), namely the original 
solution cannot be determined, or will not occur in a reduced lattice base defined by LLL [21]. Notice 
that only such a ƀ1, …, ƀn from which a right bit string can be deduced will be a reasonable solution 
vector. Experiments show that when D > 1, the probability that the original solution or a reasonable 
solution is found through LLL lattice base reduction is almost zero [22]. 
Hence, LLL lattice base reduction attack on ASSP [21][23] is utterly ineffectual, which illustrates 
that even although a DLP with the modulus bit-length less than 1024 can be solved, the original or a 
reasonable ƀ1…ƀn cannot be found yet in DLP subexponential time, namely ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) is 
computationally one-way. 
4.2.2   Compression Algorithm Is Weakly Collision-free 
Assume that b1bn  0 is a short message or a message digest from a classical hash function. By 
Definition 3, we easily understand that ƀi = ḅi 2 i  n i  [1, n]. 
Given a short message b1bn  0, and let b′1b′n  0 be another short message to need to be found. 
Let ƀ1…ƀn be the bit long-shadow string of b1bn, and ƀ′1…ƀ′n be the bit long-shadow string of 
b′1b′n. 
Let lĥ be the compression algorithm of the new non-iterative hash function described in Section 3.2. 
Hence, we have 
ḏ = lĥ(b1bn) =  n i=1 Ciƀi % M,  
and 
ḏ ′ = lĥ(b′1b′n) =  n i=1 Ciƀ′i % M, 
where ƀi = ḅi 2i with  i = bi + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2), and ƀ′i = ḅ′i 2 ′i with  ′i = b′i + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2). 
If ḏ = ḏ ′, there is  
 n i=1 Ciƀi   n i=1 Ciƀ′i (% M). 
Observe an extreme case. 
Assume that C1 = … = Cn = C. 
Owing to the max of 0  ƀi  n, we define logically  
n i=1Cƀi  n i=1C(n + 1)n – iƀi (% M). 
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Under the circumstances, if ḏ = ḏ ′, then there is 
 n i=1 C (n + 1)n – iƀi   n i=1 C (n + 1)n – iƀ′i (% M),  
namely 
C  
n   
i
 
=
 
1 
(n + 1)n – iƀi  C  n   i = 1 (n + 1)n – iƀ′i (% M). 
Let z   n i=1 ƀi (n + 1)n – i (% ), and z′   n i=1 ƀ′i (n + 1)n – i (% ). 
Correspondingly,  
C z  C z′ (% M). 
We need to solve the above equation for z′. 
If the order C is known, let z′ = z + kC, where k  1 is an integer. Once a fit k is found, there will 
be C z  C z ′ (% M), and a bit string can be inferred from ƀ′1…ƀ′n. However, seeking C is of the integer 
factorization problem (IFP) at present because the prime factors of  must be known. 
In practice, C1, …, Cn that are produced through the algorithm in Section 3.1 are pairwise unequal, 
which implies that for any given short message b1bn, seeking another short message b′1b′n such that 
 n i=1 Ciƀi   n i=1 Ciƀ′i (% M) is harder than the IFP in computational complexity, namely b′1b′n for 
lĥ(b1bn) = lĥ(b′1b′n) cannot be found in IFP subexponential time. 
Therefore, we say that the new non-iterative hash function is weakly collision-free. 
4.2.3   Compression Algorithm Is Resistant to Birthday Attack 
First, observe an example of whether any two students in a class have the same birthday. 
Suppose that the class has 23 students. If a teacher specifies a day (say February 12), then the chance 
that at least one student is born on that day is (1 – (364 / 365)23)  6.11 %. However, the probability 
that at least one student has the same birthday as any other student is around (1 – (365…343 / 
36523))  50.73 %, which prompts birthday attack on hash functions. Notice that the number x of 
students will need increasing to 249 (> 365 / 2) if the teacher wants to make (1 – (364 / 365)x) = 50 %. 
Birthday attack, a type of strongly collision-free attack, is widely exploited for finding any two 
messages  and ′ such that ĥ() = ĥ(′), namely (, ′) is a collision, where ĥ is a hash function 
[24]. If the bit-length of a message digest is m, an adversary can find a collision (, ′) such that ĥ() 
= ĥ(′) with probability 50% in roughly 1.1774  2m / 2 time, namely with input of 1.1774  2m / 2 
random messages [25]. 
However, to the new non-iterative hash, a collision is transformed into a mapping which is a type of 
weakly collision-free attack. 
Theorem 1: The new non-iterative hash function is resistant to birthday attack on the assumption 
that the MPP and ASPP have only exponential time solutions. 
Proof: 
Let b1bn and b′1b′n be two arbitrary different short messages, and ƀ1…ƀn and ƀ′1…ƀ′n be their bit 
long-shadow strings respectively. 
Suppose that ḏ = ḏ ′, namely  n i=1 Ciƀi   n i=1 Ciƀ′i (% M). 
Because the ASPP has only exponential time solutions, we cannot directly solve ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀ′i (% M) 
for ƀ′1…ƀ′n. 
In terms of the supposition, there is 
 n i=1 (Ai W ℓ (i))δ ƀi   n i=1 (Ai W ℓ (i))δ ƀ′i (% M). 
Further, 
W ḵ δ  n i=1(Ai)δ ƀi  W ḵ ′ δ  n i=1(Ai)δ ƀ′i (% M), 
where ḵ =  n i=1 ƀi ℓ(i), ḵ ′ =  n i=1 ƀ′i ℓ(i) % , and ḵ  ḵ ′ < 4n(2ñ + 3). 
Raising either side of the above congruence to the δ –1-th power yields 
W ḵ  n i=1 Aiƀ i  W ḵ ′  n i=1 Aiƀ ′i (% M). 
Without loss of generality, let ḵ  ḵ ′. Because ( * M , ·) is an Abelian group, we have 
W ḵ – ḵ ′   n i=1Aiƀ′i( n i=1 Aiƀi)–1 (% M). 
Due to either  / 2 = a prime or the least prime factor of  / 2 > 4n(2ñ + 3), there is 
W 2k  ( n i=1 Aiƀ′i – ƀi)((ḵ – ḵ ′) / 2k)–1 (% M),                         (1) 
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where k  [0, 46) is a small integer, (ḵ  ḵ ′) / 2k is a prime, and W  (1,  ) as a component of a private 
key is determinate, which manifests that if ƀ1…ƀn and ƀ′1…ƀ′n satisfy (1), there will be ḏ = ḏ ′. 
For clear explanation, (1) is written as the form of a function: 
x 2k  ( n i=1 Aiƀ′i – ƀi)((ḵ – ḵ ′) / 2k)–1 (% M).                          (2) 
Since  contains only one 2-factor, (2) has only two solutions when k  0. 
In other words, we may define a mapping from {0, 1}n  {0, 1}n to {1, …, }: 
 (b1bn, b′1b′n)  ( n i=1Aiƀ′i – ƀi)((ḵ – ḵ ′) / 2k)–1 (% M), 
where ƀi = ḅi 2 i, ƀ′i = ḅ′i 2 i, ḵ =  n i=1 ƀi ℓ(i), ḵ′ =  n i=1 ƀ′i ℓ(i) % , k  [0, 46) is a integer, and (ḵ  ḵ ′) / 2k 
is a prime. 
Therefore, only if (b1bn, b′1b′n) = W 2k with k  [0, 46), can there exists ḏ = ḏ ′. Obviously,  
(b1bn, b′1b′n)  {0, 1}n  {0, 1}n, the probability that (b1bn, b′1b′n) = W 2k is nearly k/2m 
(the number of values in the form of W 2k is at most k). 
Further, let ṉ be the number of (b1bn, b′1b′n)′s which need to be inputted in order to find at least 
one (b1bn, b′1b′n) such that (b1bn, b′1b′n) = W2k with probability 50%, namely to find any two 
messages b1bn and b′1b′n such that lĥ(b1bn) = lĥ(b′1b′n) with probability 50%. Then, ṉ satisfies 
1–((2m–k)/2m)ṉ = 50%. Resorting to computation, we see that ṉ is nearly equal to 2m – 1 with k  [0, 46). 
The 2m – 1 is far larger than the threshold 1.1774  2m / 2 for the effective birthday attack. The reason 
is that a hidden restriction is imposed on the input (b1bn, b′1b′n), which is easily understood as the 
number of students of the class needs to be increased for finding any two students who have both the 
same birthday and the same gender with probability 50%. 
Additionally, because a private key ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ) is unknown for the adversary, and the MPP is 
intractable, it is also infeasible that the adversary finds specific b1bn and b′1b′n which make (1) hold 
according to the private key. 
Therefore, the new non-iterative hash can be resistant to the birthday attack, and at present, its 
security is nearly the O(2m) magnitude, but not O(2m / 2).                                     
4.2.4   Compression Algorithm Is Resistant to Meet-in-the-middle Attack 
Meet-in-the-middle dichotomy used for attack on an intended expansion of a block cipher was first 
developed by Diffie and Hellman in 1977 [26]. Section 3.10 of [1] brings forth a meet-in-the-middle 
attack algorithm for solving a subset sum problem. 
Let b1bn be a short message, and its digest be ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M). 
If bn / 2 = bn = 1 (thus, any bit shadow on the left of the middle point has no relation with bits on the 
right), an adversary may attempt to attack the ASPP ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) by the meet-in-the-middle 
method. 
However, owing to ƀi = ḅi 2i with  i = bi + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2) for every i  [1, n], when i is from 1 to n / 2, 
there exists  
ƀ1…ƀn / 2 = (ḅ1 2b1 + n / 2)…(ḅn / 2 2bn), 
which involves all the bits of the short message, namely a reasonable middle point does not exist. 
If a fork is selected in proportion to (n / 3 : 2n / 3) or (n / 4 : 3n / 4), the right of the fork substantially 
still involves all the bits b1, …, bn.  
For instance, let n = 12, a short message (a bit string) = b1…b12, and a fork be to (4 : 8), then 
ƀ5…ƀ12 = (ḅ5 2b11)(ḅ6 2b12)(ḅ7 2b1) (ḅ8 2b2)(ḅ9 2b3)(ḅ10 2b4)(ḅ11 2b5)(ḅ12 2b6) 
involves all the bits b1, …, b12. 
The above dissection manifests that the meet-in-the-middle attack is essentially ineffectual on the 
new non-iterative hash function. Therefore, even if n = m, namely the input length = the output length 
of the function, the time complexity of the attack task is still O(2m) at present, but not O(m2m / 2). 
Besides, unlike  n i=1 ci =  n i=1 bi ci +  n i=1 bi ci in the SSP, there is not 
 n i=1 Ci =  n i=1 Ciƀi  n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) 
in the ASPP, where ƀi is the bit long-shadow of bi, which implies there does not exist an easy 
relation between the ASPP ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) and the dichotomy. 
4.2.5   Compression Algorithm Is Resistant to Multi-block Differential Attack 
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The [27] and [28] show that multi-block near differential attack is effective on the iterative hash 
functions MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1, and SHA-256 which have multiple block-inputs and the Merkle- 
Damgård structure [4][5]. 
It is well known that MD5, SHA-0, or SHA-1 will execute a number of rounds of inner manipulation 
for every input block, and each round of the inner manipulation consists of linear arithmetics and/or 
logic operators such as addition, shift, and, not, exclusive or, etc. 
The input of the new non-iterative hash function is a short message which may be treated as only 
one block. Its inner manipulation consists of at most 2n modular multiplications which is nonlinear and 
intricate, which indicates that the differential analysis of ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) loses a basis. 
Furthermore, in the new non-iterative hash, the inner nonlinear manipulation leads to the fierce 
snowslide effect and strong noninvertibility (see Section 4.2.1), and makes it impossible to derive a set 
of sufficient conditions which ensure that the collision differential characteristics hold for two short 
messages which are expected to produce a collision. 
Therefore, the new non-iterative hash is substantially distinct from the classical iterative hashes 
MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1 etc, and the multi-block near differential attack suitable for the classical iterative 
hashes will be utterly ineffective on the new non-iterative hash function. 
4.2.6   Compression Algorithm Is Strongly Collision-free 
Firstly, it is known from Section 4.2.2 that the new non-iterative hash function lĥ is weakly 
collision-free. 
Secondly, for any arbitrary short message b1bn, if want to find another short message b′1b′n such 
that lĥ(b1bn) = lĥ(b′1b′n), adversaries must take ƀ′1…ƀ′n from  n i=1 Ciƀi   n i=1 Ciƀ′i (% M), and further 
acquire the bit string b′1b′n. It is known from Section 4.2.2 that such a collision problem is 
computationally harder than IFP now. 
Thirdly, the new non-MDS hash is resistant to classical or efficient attacks in common use ― the 
birthday attack, meet-in-the-middle attack, and multi-block differential attack for example. 
Lastly, any subexponential time algorithm for solving the ASPP ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) is not found yet 
[29], and the most efficient method of solving ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M) is brute force attack so far. The 
analysis manifests that the security of the new non-iterative hash gets the O(2m) magnitude at present. 
In sum, the new hash function is strongly collision-free. Further, we may give a related theorem. 
Theorem 2: If any arbitrary collision of the new non-iterative hash function can be found in 
subexponential time, the ASPP  n i=1 Cii  1 (% M) can be solved in subexponential time, where i  
[n, n] is the difference of two bit long-shadows at the same position. 
Proof:  
According to Definition 3, it is easy to understand that for each ƀi, there is 0  ƀi  n. 
Let b1bn  b′1b′n  0 be two arbitrary bit strings, ƀ1…ƀn and ƀ′1…ƀ′n be respectively two 
corresponding bit long-shadow strings. 
Again let i = ƀi  ƀ′i, and then there is i  [n, n]. 
Since the interval [n, n] is wider than [0, n], similar to ḏ   n i=1 Ciƀi (% M), the ASPP  n i=1 Cii  1 
(% M) with i  [n, n] has no subexponential time solution [29], and is only faced with brute force 
attack. 
Assume that  n i=1 Ciƀi   n i=1 Ciƀ′i (% M) is a found collision between two arbitrary bit strings b1bn 
and b′1b′n in subexponential time. 
From  n i=1 Ciƀi   n i=1 Ciƀ′i (% M), we have 
 n i=1 Ciƀi  ƀ′i  1 (% M). 
Let i  ƀi  ƀ′i  [n, n], and then 
 n i=1 Cii  1 (% M), 
which means that the ASPP  n i=1 Cii  1 (% M) can be solved efficiently in subexponential time. It is in 
direct contradiction to the fact. 
Therefore, the new non-iterative hash function is strongly collision-free.                      
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5 Comparison with the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann Hash 
The Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash function is provably secure, and defined as follows [12]: 
ĥ: w1, w2  ĥ(w1, w2) = w1  w2 % p  ({0, ..., q  1}2  p  {0}), 
where w1 and w2 are the two complementary parts of a short message, p and q (= (p  1) / 2) are two big 
primes, and  and  are two generators of the group ( * p , ·).  
Hence, the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash function based on the difficulty of the DLP  =  x % p 
compresses a short message of 2(lg p  1) bits into a digest of lg p bits. 
Let lg p = 1024, and then the time complexity of computing log  % p is 280 according to the 
subexponential time Lp[1 /3, 1.923] [1], which means that the security of the Chaum-Heijst- Pfitzmann 
hash is the 280 magnitude when lg p = 1024. 
Let lg M = 80, and then the time complexity of solving the ASPP ḏ =  n i=1Ciƀi % M for ƀ1, …, ƀn is 
also 280 since the ASPP only has an exponential time solution at present [29], which means that the 
security of the new non-iterative hash is also the 280 magnitude when lg M = 80. Besides, let the 
bit-length n = 2046 of a short message (w1, w2) = (b1…b1023, b1024…b2046) = b1…bn  0. 
Under the same security, may draw a comparison between the new non-iterative hash (the JUNA 
hash) and the Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash. 
Table 1. Comparison between two non-iterative hashes. 
 Chaum-Heijst-Pfitzmann hash JUNA hash 
Running time (bit operations) 2(4lgp3) = 8589934592  4nm2 = 52428800  
Compression rate 1024 / 2046  50.05% 80 / 2046  3.91% 
Resistant to birthday attack No 
because the number of (w1, w2)′s 
needed during birthday attack is 
about 2lg p / 2 = 2512, and larger 
than 280 which is the security 
magnitude of the DLP. 
Yes 
because the number of b1…bn′s 
needed during birthday attack is 
about 2lg M / 2 = 240, and smaller 
than 280 which is the security 
magnitude of the ASPP. 
Provably strongly 
collision-free 
Yes 
on the assumption that a DLP has 
a subexponential time solution. 
Yes 
on the assumption that an ASPP 
has an exponential time solution. 
In summary, the JUNA hash has some advantages over the Chaum-Heijst- Pfitzmann one, and 
relatively the JUNA hash may be regarded lightweight. 
6 Reformation of a Classical Hash Function 
Because the new non-iterative hash function is resistant to birthday attack and meet-in- the-middle 
attack, a classical hash function of which the output is m bits, and the security is intended to be the 
O(2m / 2) magnitude may be reformed into a compact hash function of which the output is m / 2 bits, and 
the security is still equivalent to the O(2m / 2) magnitude [30]. 
For example, let b1b128 be the output of MD5 [31], ḇ1ḇ128 be its bit long-shadow string, and 
lg M = 64. Then, regard ḏ =  128 i=1 Ciḇi % M as the 64-bit output of the reformed MD5 with the 
equivalent security, where Ci = (Ai W ℓ (i))δ % M which is produced by the algorithm in Section 3.1. 
Again for example, let b1b160 be the output of SHA-1[1], ḇ1 ḇ160 be its bit long-shadow string, 
and lg M = 80. Then, regard ḏ =  160 i=1 Ciḇi % M as the 80-bit output of the reformed SHA-1 with the 
equivalent security. 
The above two examples indicate that we may exchange time for space when the related security 
remains unchanged. 
7 Conclusion 
In the paper, the authors propose a new non-iterative hash function which contains the initialization 
algorithm and the compression algorithm, and converts a short message or a message digest of n bits 
into a string of m bits, where 80  m  232 and 80  m  n  4096. 
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The authors analyze the security of the new non-iterative hash function. The analysis shows that the 
new non-iterative hash is computationally one-way, weakly collision-free, and strongly collision-free. 
Moreover, at present, any subexponential time algorithm for attacking the new non-iterative hash is not 
found, and its security is to the O(2m) magnitude. 
Especially, the analysis illustrates that the new non-iterative hash function is resistant to birthday 
attack and meet-in-the-middle attack, and that the running time of its compression algorithm is O(n m2) 
bit operations. 
The application of the new hash may be extended. In recent years, the ECC-160 digital signing 
scheme, an analogue of the ElGamal digital signing scheme based on the DLP in an elliptic curve 
group over a finite field [32][33], and some lightweight digital signing schemes ― the optimized 
version of the REESSE1+ digital signing scheme [6] for example have been utilized for RF ID (Radio 
Frequency Identity) tags or non-RF ID tags [34][35][36]. While a RF ID tag contains an IC chip which 
is used to store signatures and other data, an non-RF ID tag, a BFID [37] ― for example contains no IC 
chip because a signature from a lightweight or ultra-lightweight signing scheme may be symbolized in 
short length, and printed directly on a papery tag or label. At present, such tags are applied to the 
identification, authentication, or anti-forgery of financial-notes, certificates, diplomas, and 
commodities, particularly including food and drug. 
Hence, the new non-iterative hash function opens a door to convenience for the utilization of a 
lightweight digital signing scheme of which the modulus length is not greater than 160 bits. 
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Appendix A: An Example 
Let lgM = 80, and n = 256. 
Solving the MPP:  
Given M = 636743755563737235857207, and {C1, , C256} =  
{394375509141369037703184,554405328844801192217442,398990392120059456829699,63606871
0931207324336104,179366946033260810673265,182182128843950184496233,28365343276279896
0694200,391748237477785007893514,94461230573833399041634,146396573827145853058025,544
816169334706503213027,364481169034548457969826,477943409648888873528887,495981229119
127077122569,303247879531079652865837,30261040114671964564035,6048062007680616619483
67,226709912769734878042146,21106787083544425020747,450585510787322862879583,11388974
1803376766817431,33779824107636677690000,624343348434427417711884,813943362892832145
4057,96506382190311057614248,359344008158083077617116,475087369983772394584265,286675
906747363274106643,273904561106043852824719,290154030115540709591119,542337668830272
754302104,424209565234481301351243,482163813841492061131471,127934386844210811350835,
594961208610220091706500,368457620191339441765069,333246120093389698485472,240036277
940820391108175,326079559057243941942753,180855393210421934443585,558957548924545352
698752,116963332670423702444319,620364395658763217288588,74708020842608861961919,3386
03136005253750049019,618279924416273562129128,600081310839835683212541,6066758736575
17853028369,215973513658356020420635,539913213636759819602147,6739739080158457844725
5,102206491211043454760486,171011183472338301996410,556402611627196680689898,38145810
5511009220697638,532956153792890202951438,360925851265173951197208,21660838745254761
390874,113278415082646883610336,587295387093175644250777,441835526319605486874262,495
857237690484091878476,427476083339017325472093,414844423032073223749402,267957140905
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582483315581,407775402061415484796591,473329847751824796509235,237730540937571061336
583,454275729099091444480453,25066318726221672446827,213153434564424036920709,7695544
3512116632014080,577719850708310853721751,296881334499832564905758,28082635141801498
4314614,305079484542031100608532,369948879483802705833417,178519896368431501154183,15
5944443906621900967508,358879495202308295530086,538801869715990957229057,46219020894
0699793771101,40175197813197848260986,262448765064486865723793,220262077588719269492
112,192432627187402744418430,203874081871546080137836,273615761529636585860982,470964
18315766875202081,545718729741407541033298,256902461410255239515414,8679653331105043
1751282,615699406626702658312424,7277693714609385934040,623661508518352474833795,3413
38751078837461696260,83387358592867088491634,331745118809598203756547,14600841305494
0870474217,377718668238650499325708,573308954069191320954876,19258345547082926057252
6,257636756198775697553561,457854147247221048492853,295005661335709158380650,61310489
6771788170321637,47664063113225317357072,112465310193651528643453,239327146015505183
869321,428852058761047961206417,621034609683055018803847,138845629932573936666694,389
988317063196994328710,625798568384070501018232,167048576453301484653376,639985062348
1354811793,2533120830669303709882,441364010361767243247859,215298769730452968440469,7
8885276009385645205656,366142537012652261414173,106705557479793492902577,34204768859
6789250089719,383295777538093497752089,226822823393548166858605,45472200978803464704
1861,96411007386730717155815,152271197161087713633906,425287855627697178809174,226205
831082936831340019,79145491695715867356427,243448386701422251112551,3465948018151363
7217315,62716951977126000974993,469120356154738212445264,618660910804439681244744,484
254940080337537672234,572166973409032644768790,3660579547160449865375,26312791843352
9780572115,170212898238335696139941,422732042511190107949564,30844604061253329995310
5,373003147046146839017941,509025463714927591001093,375881626021462104944196,58745770
8299708909023357,115257190305617586537407,610881911245478642078000,48375260940199943
3108445,217261946718280470713735,533424298980600127268003,361984585662190582028097,13
4348066141750912501798,403240403838225119367554,313367491914963584952010,24943420419
8818855115174,539488866558263483937488,399519957905911405204918,49133357241379952290
6743,616764503083569121724952,498941513621940376156838,360115355217060253333938,28675
6596346655156944400,543341681019728138219968,240993764872128300299962,18798947385919
6573392152,137421203010702125156501,489873292467205032012327,61296148343986720122971
6,633009400619994839941913,442965146354422859554362,322638110572502910167370,32234558
3769379567431049,462590776934506038776857,368824221513851136474572,22379442394454434
9100743,442946162562545923022539,535412005420704431112529,434535990291959608671501,60
5645010994779584866952,8070206291501441965154,493511370954416873059008,6188360274190
14613362898,590662580024211355162012,457494664211307406557064,9636134770074849166338
4,120583811596327848299164,180442197235245703784100,405740657284513824054844,40431194
047718221412170,468082207913731037323835,229468643859253759600978,598297710404864974
354341,209048001585555967856547,457743106588718408708912,596519246673853139695397,608
540108389989364933186,555583430086257539238992,353434117833141924681370,382842801308
302520061705,492071882418698492159424,621445795157335823489745,250076428477264581685
569,546213632312565034207207,497298374430742379786584,191037533658442834834989,593133
366832103108156787,212457956727128031940975,620485991163132474252386,757713731242739
57235870,260871794980499581085477,549333245096281904234582,443239692067375141612071,5
51544779707999411076756,288443772113295541911443,186925867422825217898560,3920573957
45465277837836,240883535976209539688869,549315739766192959945090,3690225479035973525
30869,235207478202534037876752,119244538852522553537061,63945386967446896983253,44799
3037869150695847160,349184653845911760345919,410978297720843053424788,29876812535317
8719219809,237490662717517417924479,601270004230179754794434,34007123330598556765721
9,554975899833724562810348,159174106445636336094312,69447150975168788093906,318489470
752076358290636,569233492081487464852735,486228321190255110795019,584931011042787342
545814,2785664312856083410998,14438706722340888857234,220309245141837703800089,135194
413116450095718244,83746532657126749294170,74688913428548277095222,23723636552989629
8380585,148733606480086004988750,60849020406129055574111,53286770559365760807706,5505
26874774302345635430,139918462219083995087941,328129290014413336506695,3975735392751
3730348711,11915217989393307961856,343253875442491197058730,541569087399401325673659,
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500378758398549449630036}, 
seek the original ({Ai}, {ℓ(i)}, W, δ) by Ci  (AiW ℓ(i))δ (% M)(i = 1, …, 256), where Ai   = {2, 3, …, 
287117}, and ℓ(i)   = {+/5, +/7, …, +/515}. 
Solving the ASPP:  
Given the initial value (M, {C1, , C256}) that precedes, a short message  = {b1, …, b256} =  
{1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,1
,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,1,1,1,
0,1,1,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,1,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,1,1,0,
0,0,1,1,1,0,1,1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,
0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0}, 
and the digest ḏ = 566936505785934227489970, 
seek a collision with  by ḏ   n i=1Ciḇi (% M), where ḇi = ḅi2i with  i = bi + (1) 2(i – 1) / n (n / 2). 
 
